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INTRODUCTION 
By December 1942, when these Bulletins begin, the tide of World War II 
was beginning to turn against the Axis powers. The United States had been 
a combatant for a year, and the USSR for a year and a half. In Europe, the 
British and the Americans were beginning to assert mastery of the skies 
over the Nazi-occupied continent. In North Africa, General Montgomery 
had just defeated Field Marshall Rommell in the great desert battle of El 
Alamein; within a few months the Allies would be landing in Sicily to begin 
a thrust at Hitler's 'soft underbelly' in Italy. In the Soviet Union, the Nazi 
advance had been halted, and the catasü-ophic German defeat at Stalingrad 
was about to unfold. In the Pacific, the ultimately decisive naval battle of 
Midway had halted the Japanese advance westward in the spring, and the 
Americans were driving the Japanese from Guadalcanal through December 
and January. For Canadians, the dark days of early 1940 when Canada stood 
at Britain's side against a triumphant Hitler straining at the English Channel 
were history, replaced by a confidence that in the now globalized struggle 
the Allies held the ultimately winning hand. 
Confidence in final victory abroad did not of course obscure the terrible 
costs, material and human, which were still to be exacted. World War 11 
was a total war, in a way in which no earlier conflict could match. The 
1914-1918 war took a worse toll of Canada's soldiers, but what was most 
chilling about the 1939-45 struggle was to the degree to which civilian 
non-combatants were targeted by the awesomely lethal technology of 
death. Canadians were of course immune from direct Axis attack from the 
skies, but this did not diminish the definition of the war as one not of army 
against army but of people against people, which finally culminated in the 
atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, but was already 
prefigured in the Nazi extermination camps and the Allied firebombings of 
German cities like Hamburg and Dresden. In a war of people against 
people, all resources — economic, social, political, human — were to be 
mobilized. Such a war could only be justified in terms of ideology, a 'battle 
for the minds of men' as the phrase went. 1914-1918 had been seen as a 
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struggle between nationalities, a clash of competing patriotisms. 1939-45 
was this as well, but it was also patriotism marching under the ideological 
banners of Fascism, Conununism, and Democracy. 
In this kind of war, there were always two fronts: one where armies 
clashed, and a second at home. The home front was where the battle for 
war production had to be won, where civilian morale and enthusiasm was 
to be maintained and defeatism crushed, where enemy espionage, sabotage 
and subversion were to be countered. The spectre of the 'Fifth Column* — 
the enemy's agents within our gates — had been vividly impressed on 
Canadian minds in 1940, but it never entirely disappeared, even as op-
timism grew of eventual Allied victory. Fosters in public places warned 
Canadians of the dangers of 'loose lips' sinking ships, of the spies and 
saboteurs in their midst ready to pounce upon any weakness or misplaced 
confidence. Government employment was greatly swelled by wartime 
activity, and tens of thousands of employees were subjected to fingerprint-
ing and security screening. The press was censored, as were the mails. 
Organizations were banned as subversive, and some Canadians were seized 
by the state and interned as potential enemies of the war effort based on 
their ethnicity, or their ideological associations. The ultimate culmination 
was the involuntary removal of the Japanese-Canadian population of the 
west coast to camps in the interior, along with the confiscation and disposal 
of much of their property. 
Complaints voiced by minorities about the conduct of the state in 
invading and curtailing the rights of private citizens and associations were 
generally met with indifference or active hostility on the part of the agencies 
of the state and by the press and those powerful majority groups who 
identified wholeheartedly with a 'total' war effort. Civil libertarians, as few 
and far between as they were in wartime Canada, worried about the 
total i tari an i zing effect of a total war against totalitarianism. While it would 
be ludicrous to compare the home front with the war front in terms of the 
costs in human liberty (or indeed to compare the Canadian home front with 
those in Germany, Japan or Soviet Russia), the war did have brutalizing 
effects on the fabric of liberty and civility in Canadian society. The RCMP 
did not initiate these policies, but they were charged with carrying out 
surveillance for the state in pursuit of security and mobilization of loyalty. 
They acted in many cases as the cutting edge of state repression and their 
activities in this role must be assessed in the wider context of a total war. 
One new wartime role for the RCMP about which the Bulletins remain 
entirely silent — or at least remain silent after the CSIS censors have 
applied their scissors — was counter-intelligence. Intelligence and counter-
intelligence were primary elements of the military struggle. There was for 
instance the celebrated 'Double Cross' system whereby Abwehr [German 
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military intelligence] spies were detected and 'turned', to the extent that 
British counter-intelligence, in the words of one British participant, 'ac-
tively ran and controlled the German espionage system in [Britain]' The 
Double Cross system had its attractions for the Mounties, who tried their 
hand at it — with disappointing results. 
In November 1942 an Abwehr agent was landed by U-boat in Quebec. 
Detected almost immediately and arrested by the RCMP, the agent con-
fessed and agreed to become a double agent. In an operation codenamed 
Watchdog, the Mounties set themselves up in business with a transmitter 
beamed to Hamburg. The officer in charge, Clifford Harvison (later a 
Commissioner of the force after the war), was so pleased that he sent off 
the transcripts of his interrogation of the German agent to London. Unfor-
tunately for the Mounties' self-esteem, the MI5 team quickly concluded 
that the information disclosed about German operations was worthless. 
Although the recently published official history of British security and 
counter-intelligence during the war is somewhat cryptic on this point, 
noting only that Watchdog proved 'truculent' and 'difficult to handle' and 
had eventually to be interned in Britain, two Canadian historians quote 
one of the MI5 men as recalling that Watchdog had clearly 'made a monkey 
out of Harvison'. The RCMP had to call upon the British to help them out, 
and soon Cyril Mills, an MI5 officer experienced in the Double Cross 
system. Hew to Canada to lake over the case. Mills apparently discovered 
later that Watchdog had secretly informed his German masters of his 
capture, but that the RCMP had not detected this. Harvison himself had 
to take his putative double agent to Britain for detention, after which he 
remained for a number of months undergoing basic training in counter-in-
telligence from MI5. Harvison's own memoirs gloss over this less than 
exemplary story. Nor were two other German agents landed in Canada 
successfully converted to Allied use. The 'only successful double-cross 
operation in Canada' was entirely fictitious — an invention of MI5 (ap-
propriately codenamed Moonheaml) was 'notionally' transferred to 
Canada to the evident enthusiasm of the gullible Abwehr. 
J.C. Masterman, The Double Cross System (London 1973). xii. 
F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, British Inlelligence in the Second World War, 
V.4: Security and Coiinler-lnlellinence (London 1990), 228. 
J.L. Granatslein and D;ivid Stafford, Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from 
Couzenko lo Clasnost (Toronto 1990), 26-8. 
•"CW. Harvison, The Horsemen (Toronto 1967), esp. 105-21. 
Hinsley & Simkins, Security. 228. The RCMP's own correspondence re Moon-
beam seems to have convinced the RCMP historians that he actually existed; Carl 
Betke and S.W. Horrali, 'Canada's Security Service: an historical outline, 1864-
1966'(RCMPHistorical Section 1978),obtainedunder Accessio Information from 
CSIS Files, ! 17-90-107, 568, n. 28. 
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There was another instance of foreign espionage in which Canadians 
showed greater finesse. A Spanish press officer had been detected in 
pro-German espionage activity by MI6. The same official later turned up 
in North America where he attempted to organize another spy network 
among Spanish journalists and diplomats on behalf of Japan. Presumably 
he would have been flagged by MI6 for observation. According to one 
source, 'this network was abandoned when a Canadian counter-intelligence 
officer caught them encoding information for transmission'. This is ap-
parently a reference to an incident in 1943. The Spanish Consul General in 
Vancouver, Senor Fernando de Kobbe, was deported for spying on behalf 
of the Japanese. The RCMP and FBI had intercepted cash payments and 
detailed instruction for the Consul and had acquired evidence that he was 
using the Spanish diplomatic pouch to send his replies. 
The Consul was quietly returned to Spain. Evidence of the spying was 
then passed to the British to be used against Spain. As Norman Robertson 
of External Affairs noted in a memorandum to the Prime Minister, the 
information would allow the Allies 'to put the screws to Franco. In the 
present phase of the European political situation, the threat of exposure of 
Spanish collusion with the Axis may be a very useful lever in securing 
further concession from Spain, or if this course seems more desirable, (it) 
could be used to discredit the present dictatorial regime entirely.' External 
Affairs officer Tommy Stone (who specialized in intelligence matters) 
added a note that 'the implied threat of a most disagreeable public scandal 
might result in a general clean-up of the anti-United Nations activities in 
the Spanish foreign service.' 
In the case of the Spanish Consul, it was External Affairs which guided 
the RCMP to an appropriate way of handling counter-espionage. Watchdog 
suggested that on their own the Mounties were not especially competent. 
If the Mounties flunked their entry test into the spying big leagues, this was 
hardly surprising. Nothing in their background as a prairie police force 
chasing down horse thieves and controlling Saturday night drunks had 
prepared them for the delicate and complex world of international 
espionage. Just after the end of World War II, one of the biggest interna-
tional espionage cases in the world erupted in Ottawa with the defection of 
Igor Gouzenko. Gouzenko's evidence indicated that throughout the latter 
^Phillip Knighiley, Philby. KGB Masierspy (Lonàon 1988), 104, citing 'Spanish 
diplomal admits spying in US and Lx)ndon', The Times, 21 Sept 1978. See also 
Hinslcy&Simkins,5ccunry, 107-9.161;andPhilby,M>S(7e/if »Vor(London 1968). 
35-6. 
Naiional Archives of Canada (NAC). William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers. 
Correspondence, v.272. p. 187002. N.A. Robcrt.son loMackenzie King. 3 Nov 1943. 
^/bid., p. 187010. T.A. Stone. 22 January 1944. 
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war years there had been extensive espionage organized from the Soviet 
Embassy involving a number of Canadians in positions of trust within the 
government itself. None of this had been detected by the Mounties until 
Gouzenko fell so astonishingly into their laps. Of course, the discovery of 
Soviet spying, linked to Canadian Communism, was much more to the 
Mounties' ideological taste than finding agents of the Third Reich. They 
might not have caught any Communist spies on their own, but they could 
certainly attest to the fact that they had never wavered in their determination 
to warn Canadians against the dangers of Communism. 
The Watchdog fiasco did have one important implication for the 
RCMP's role in the world of intelligence. The arrival of Cyril Mills from 
MI5 proved to be a important step in the tightening linkage of the RCMP 
to the British and American counter-intelligence network. Mills stayed on 
in Ottawa for the duration of the war and was employed as MI5's point man 
in liaison with Washington, to which he made frequent trips. 
There is a rather complicated background to the growing continental 
connection in wartime security and intelligence, involving two competing 
players in Washington (J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI, and 'Wild Bill' 
Donovan who fashioned the OSS, America's first civilian intelligence 
agency to operate abroad), as well as WiUiam Stephenson, the Canadian 
whose BSC (British Security Coordination) was the initial point of contact 
between the British government and the Americans on North American 
intelligence matters. In 1941, Donovan wanted to become coordinator of 
information in the western hemisphere, working with the State Department, 
the BSC, and the Canadians. Agreement in principle was reached on 
stationing Donovan's representatives at 'certain key points' in Canada so 
as to facilitate access to vital information. Hoover was brought in to talk 
about liaison with RCMP. Donovan recommended a joint intelligence 
committee of representatives from the departments of State, War, Navy, 
Justice, his own Office for Coordination of Information, and Canada's 
department of External Affairs, to be located in Washington. Its 'primary 
concern' was the defence of the USA. Hoover was outraged and was able 
to obtain a presidential directive on 29 December 1941 that re-affirmed the 
responsibility of the FBI to operate its Special Intelligence Service in 
Canada, Mexico, and Latin America, but also directed all other intelligence 
agencies to clear 'any intelligence work' in these areas with the FBI. 
Hoover was authorized and instructed to convene meetings of the various 
Q 
There is no mention of Gouzenko in these Bulletins, since his defection and the 
subsequent publicity surrounding the case postdated the war. In a volume of 
Bulletins covering the latter half of the 1940s, to be published later in this series, 
readers will sec that the security service took extensive note of the implications of 
Gouzenko. 
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hemispheric intelligence agencies to work in this area. Hoover could not 
tolerate Stephenson; with his bureaucratic triumph over Donovan on juris-
diction in the Western hemisphere, the BSC's days were numbered. The 
BSC under the direction of Stephenson continued to carry out certain 
duties, especially vetting, on behalf of MI5 in the United States, but Mills 
was the major official contact with J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI on counter-
espionage matters. 
The RCMP had been developing closer intelligence contacts of their 
own with the FBI since the late 1930s. Now that Canada was at war, 
international co-operation deepened. Hoover visited Ottawa in late 1940, 
more than a year before America was drawn into the conflict, and conferred 
with the RCMP director of criminal intelligence. The agenda was 'almost 
entirely devoted to security tasks' including espionage; Nazi fifth colum-
nists operating out of the US with designs on Canada; the rehability of 
Japanese residents; subversive American organizations; and 'what to do 
about hundreds of Canadian and thousands of American passports known 
^Tiomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: a History of the Establishment of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (Frederick, Md. 1981), 111-19; the bitter relationship 
between Donovan and Hoover is detailed in Äthan G. Theoharis & John Stuart Cox, 
The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American lnquisition(Phi\ade\ph\a 1988), 
188-91. 
Hinsley & Simkins, i'ecur//)', 187. This official history, published in 1990, primly 
avoids naming Mills, although his identity had already been disclosed in Nigel 
West, A Matter of Trust: MI5. 1945-72 (London 1982), 26. He is also referred to 
by name in Granatstein & Stafford, Spy Wars. 
BSC vetting did not always prove adequate. Physicist Bruno Pontecorvo was 
passed by the BSC for Canadian work on nuclear energy: see Margaret Cowing, 
Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy I945-I952, v.2 (London 
1974), 151. In fact the British director of the 'Tube Alloys' [i.e., atomic research) 
project reported to his assistant that the BSC had provided an 'unusually enthusiastic 
report' on Pontecorvo: Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: the History of Atomic Energy of 
Canada Ltd. (Toronto 1988), 30. Unfortunately for the RCMP and for MI5, who 
both took BSC clearance as adequate, Pontecorvo defected to the Soviet Union in 
1950. After his disappearance, the FBI said they had passed information to the BSC 
in 1943 indicating that Communist literature had been found in his house in the 
United Slates, but it was impossible to check this because the wartime organisation 
had been disbanded. On the other hand, the highly security-conscious US General 
Leslie Groves (in charge of the Manhatten Project) complained in 1945 about 
'foreigners' working on the Canadian project and insisted that they either take on 
citizenship or leave. Pontecorvo assumed citizenship and stayed; Groves 
pronounced himself 'pleased': Bothwell, 78. In any event, Pontecorvo did have 
Communist relatives and associations in his native Italy, a point that could have 
been readily verified had anyone followed up. 
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to be in the hands of Moscow'. ̂ ^ After Pearl Harbour, more official liaison 
was established, but squarely within the triangular Atlantic relationship. 
Before his organization was marginalized at Hoover's insistence, Sir 
William Stephenson drew upon RCMP assistance, particularly the tem-
porary loan of personnel, including the head of the Records Branch 
seconded as a 'filing expert*. Another expert who left the RCMP to take 
up a permanent post with the BSC in the spring of 1941 was Superintendent 
Ernest W. Bavin, an intelligence officer. Bavin's departure was smoothed 
by the fact that Bavin had been experiencing 'some friction' in his working 
relationship with Commissioner S.T. Wood. The Mountie historians point 
out that in his new position. Bavin 'discovered and communicated to the 
Force material of interest in BSC files.' 
Bavin also accompanied an MI5 mission to Canada in the summer of 
1941 that reviewed security controls in effect for the Dominion. The 
mission was not impressed with what it saw, and made a number of 
recommendations to beef up standards. Sir Winston Churchill's personal 
intelligence adviser informed the British prime minister that security in 
Canada was 'terrible' (Halifax, he was assured, was a 'hotbed of German 
spies'). At his urging, Churchill sent a special exhortation on the subject to 
Mackenzie King. Although all of the measures recommended were not put 
into effect, enough were that the BSC eventually concluded that the 
Canadian internal security situation had been improved 'beyond 
measure'. 
These arrangements not only emphasised the relative importance of 
Canada within developing Anglo-American intelligence co-operation, but 
helped give the RCMP a window looking onto the wider world. For 
example, the Mounties sent representation to a Western Hemisphere Intel-
ligence Conference in August, 1942. This international dimension was to 
become highly important in the handling of the Gouzenko affair in 1945-
46; although Cyril Mills had by this time returned to London, his place in 
liaison was taken by Peter Dwyer, an MI6 officer stationed in Washington, 
who later came to Ottawa as the leading civilian official co-ordinating 
Canadian security intelligence and counter-espionage operations in the 
1950s. 
'̂ Betke and Horrall, History, 521-2. 
'^etke and Horrall, History, 529-31. 
David Stafford, 'The American-British-Canadian triangle: British Security Co-
ordination 1940-1945', Paper presented to the International Studies Association 
Conference, London, March 1989, 33. Stafford points out that Stephenson had 
wanted a branch office of the BSC established in Ottawa to co-ordinate Canadian 
security, but that this, not surprisingly, was vetoed by Ottawa. 
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The RCMP's emerging role in counter-espionage was thus cast very 
much in a dependent, if not subordinate, relationship to its senior partners 
in Washington and London. The experience of the war years helped set a 
pattern which has remained more or less familiar ever since. In one area 
only, that of signals intelligence, did Canada develop an effective external 
intelligence capacity. The Examination Unit (an organization entirely 
separate from the RCMP) intercepted and decrypted enemy communica-
tions traffic. But in this or in its subsequent guise as the postwar Com-
munications Branch. National Research Council, and later yet as the 
Communications Security Establishment, Canadian signals intelligence 
has been effectively framed within the context of junior partner status to 
Britain and, especially, the USA. 
Despite its new role in counterintelligence, the police mentality was still 
very strong among the 'horsemen'. According to the official historians of 
the security service, the Mounties who were assigned field investigations 
in security intelligence at the outset of the war, 'still saw themselves as 
primarily policemen, not intelligence officers.' Indeed, most found the 
work 'boring', and lacking in 'glamour or glory' or clear prospects of career 
advancement in a paramilitary police force. Some tried to get transferred 
out, including Leonard Higgit, later a director of the security service, and 
even the celebrated John Leopold (the undercover star of the 1931 legal 
assault on the Communist party). This was not perhaps promising 
material out of which to fashion an effective counter-inteUigence force. Yet 
Leopold became in effect the nucleus of a branch which gradually ex-
panded both its personnel and its responsibilities throughout the war. 
In early 1940 the branch headquarters in Ottawa was comprised of three 
officers, five non-commissioned officers, eight constables and three special 
constables, along with civilian support staff Regional divisions had their 
own intelligence sections, ranging from up to 20 in large centers down to 
much smaller numbers elsewhere. The number of agents run by these 
officers mainly within Communist and fascist groups is still considered 
classified information, although the RCMP historians note that they were 
'operating reasonably evenly throughout Canada'. In early 1941, on the eve 
of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the size of the headquarters branch 
Wesley K. Wark, 'Cryptographic innocence: the origins of signals intelligence in 
Canada in the second world war', Jounuil of Contemporary History, 22 (1987), 
639-65; Granatstein & Stafford, Spy Wars. 28-46. 
Jeffrey T. Richelson & Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Coopera-
tion Between the UK USA Countries (Boston 1985); James Littleton, Target Nation: 
Canada and the Western Intelligence Network (Toronto 1986). 
Betke & Hoirall, History, 480-1. Leopold's request to be discharged with pension 
so that he could offer his services to the British was refused. 
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had mushroomed to 79 (although still only 3 officers, including the in-
defatigable Leopold). There were now no less than 12 functional divisions. 
Linguistic capabilities had expanded to encompass 24 languages. By early 
1942, with the war now expanded to Asia as well as the USSR, the 
intelligence section at headquarters weighed in at just under 100 (including 
29 stenographers and two clerks), double what it had been in early 1940. 
Thereafter, numbers declined as did the number of specialists although 
experts in 'Communism' and 'subversives' remained on the rolls. 'The 
chief internal organizational effect of the war was thus to increase Intel-
ligence Section staff to the point at which it forced precise definition of 
Intelligence Section duties and personnel in the Divisions as well as at 
Headquarters.' 
The external bureaucratic environment within which the Mounties 
operated also changed during the war. On 10 November 1942, a Joint 
Intelligence Committee was formed, made up of the directors of intel-
ligence from the three military services; the RCMP and the department of 
External Affairs were added as 'associate members'. Something along 
these lines had been strongly recommended by the British and by Sir 
William Stephenson. 'Occasional friction' had been present between the 
Mounties and Army intelligence, over what the Mounties saw as Army 
intrusion into domestic subversion and sabotage matters. The JIC provided 
a forum for smoothing out differences in interpretation of jurisdictions. It 
should be noted that after the war, a Security Panel was established with a 
secretariat housed in the Privy Council Office, which provided an expanded 
mechanism for coordination of security policy and administration in 
peacetime. The JIC was a forerunner of a new direction in the establishment 
of a permanent national security state. 
So far as the RCMP itself was concerned, the burden of its war effort 
lay where its own interest had always rested most comfortably: the protec-
tion of domestic security against the threat of subversion from alien 
ideological movements, especially from the left. Here the Mounties found 
themselves at somewhat of a disadvantage during the later war years. 
Despite the attraction of greatly increased resources, and the advantages of 
sfiecial emergency powers and the suspension of civil liberties protection 
which sometimes impeded their peacetime operations, they came up 
against the unnerving reality that after June 1941, the Soviet Union had 
become a fighting ally and the Communists vociferous proponents of a 
patriotic common front for winning the war. Throughout the period covered 
by these Bulletins, the familiar reference jwints which had guided the 
'^etkc & Horrall. History, 512-17. 
"Bctke & Horrall. //mory, 518-19. 
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security service fi-om its founding through the years of the Great Depression 
seemed to have gone somewhat askew. In this context, the force found itself 
playing a role not only as a police and security agency carrying out orders 
from the government of the day, but as a lobby from within the state 
advocating a certain policy line which was not always intrinsically popular 
with its masters. To advance its own policy preferences, the RCMP 
sometimes had to strike alliances with certain forces outside the federal 
government. Part of the story of the RCMP's role during the latter war years 
is how it arrived at its own style of bureaucratic politics, and how well it 
performed in the bureaucratic in-fighting characteristic of Ottawa. 
The main point of policy contention was the status of the Communist 
party. A legal party at the war's outset, the party had been declared an 
unlawful association under the Defence of Canada Regulations. The Nazi 
invasion of the USSR created a new political situation of which some 
people within the government, including Lester Pearson, believed Ottawa 
should take advantage. If the Communists had been suddenly converted 
from opponents into advocates of the war, Pearson suggested, Ottawa 
should not allow its natural contempt for such hypocrisy to cloud its 
judgement. Why not use the Communists as allies of convenience, espe-
cially where they could be of particular use — as in trade unions where 
they had begun demanding no-strike pledges under a win-the-war-first 
philosophy r Although certain observers have claimed to have detected a 
strain of fellow-travelling naivete in the officials who argued in this 
manner, the Ottawa mandarins were under no illusions whatever regard-
ing the nature of the Stalinist state but were pragmatic realists who wished 
to take advantage of whatever opportunities presented themselves to push 
the war effort through to a successful conclusion. 
The RCMP, however, had quite a different perspective on the question. 
As was shown in the earlier volume of these Bulletins, the change in status 
of the Soviet Union did not convince the RCMP that any change was 
indicated in their longstanding attitude toward the Communists. By 
December 1942, when this volume opens, the Bulletin is editorializing 
about the lies and hypocrisy of the Communists, and justifying the continu-
ing ban on the party [15 December 1943]. By August 1944, they greeted 
the news of the dissolution of the Comintern with the assertion (no doubt 
20 
King papers. Memoranda and Notes series, Pearson to Norman Robertson, 12 
October 1941. 
The most exu-eme variant of this revisionism is James Barres' speculation that 
'Lester Pearson was Moscow's ultimate mole' [No Sense of Evil: Espionage, the 
Caseof Herbert Norman (Toronto 1986), 169]. About the [wliticalliteracy of such 
ajudgment, perhaps the less said the better. 
^^RCMP Security Bulletins: the War Series. 1939-1941 (St. John's 1989), 371-424. 
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quite correct, it should be pointed out) that this meant absolutely nothing 
for the international reach of the Soviet Union through the agency of local 
Communist parties [1 August 1944]. Given these strongly held views, it is 
hardly surprising that the force opposed the public campaign in 1942 and 
after to legalize the Communist party as a friendly gesture toward our 
Soviet ally, a campaign which eventuated in a parliamentary committee 
recommendation to lift the ban. The ban was never lifted by the cabinet. 
An examination of the pressiu^es swirling around the government on this 
issue indicates that the RCMP found very crucial political allies in the form 
of King's Quebec ministers and his Quebec caucus, backed by the pas-
sionately anti-Communist Catholic chiu^ch, and the pro-business right-
wing of the cabinet led by CD. Howe. The Mounties thus showed that 
they could successfully play bureaucratic politics on an issue that really 
mattered to them. The fact that the Communists continued to operate under 
the guise of the Labour Progressive party and indeed under that name 
elected their first (and last) MP in the person of Fred Rose (later convicted 
of Soviet espionage) might seem to indicate that the anti-Communist 
victory was a hollow one. But to the RCMP it was important that no overt 
legitimacy be granted the Communists, and the official ban on the party 
did give the Mounties a useful lever with which to control their public, if 
not their clandestine, activities. 
Through 1944 and 1945, the Mounties continued a keen interest in the 
activities of Communist fronts, especially left-wing ethnic organizations, 
but also in civic associations within the mainstream of Canadian life which 
they believed to be unduly influenced by Communism. They were some-
times not very careful about painting people Red or Pink who were 
associated with such alleged fronts. For instance, their discussion of the 
National Council for Canadian-Soviet Friendship [1 February 1945, 223-
31 ] contains the names of many f)ersons who were probably never in-
fluenced by Communism at all. Similarly the description of the McGill 
University Labour Club (1 November 1945, 427-31) assumes that every 
member must have been a Conmiunist or dupe of the Communists. Alert 
readers might spot the name of a future minister in the Quebec Liberal 
government of the early 1970s. He seems to have suffered no smears drawn 
on his youthful political activity. Noting these apparent suggestions of guilt 
by association in the Bulletins, one is grateful that McCarthyism never 
achieved the success in Canada it enjoyed in the United States, and relieved 
that the RCMP never threw up a J. Edgar Hoover who could carefully feed 
congressional witchhunters from his secret police files. The RCMP files 
Whilaker, 'Official repression of Communism during World War 11', Labour/le 
Travail, 17 (1986), 149-52. 
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did remain secret. Despite posturing by certain opposition parliamentarians 
during the latter half of the 1940s about an alleged official covervp of 
left-wing security risks, the Mounties seem to have kept their hands, and 
their files, relatively clean. 
Nor were the Mounties unable to make distinctions between varieties of 
left-wing opinion. The social democratic left in Canadian politics, repre-
sented by the CCF in politics and by pro-CCF trade unionists in the labour 
field, is generally treated throughout these Bulletins as essentially a 
moderate bulwark against the Reds, although a constant target for infiltra-
tion by the Communists. For example, in the August 1945 (343-4) number 
an editorial from the social democratic Canadian Forum magazine is 
reprinted approvingly. 
In October 1945, the Bulletin warns about labour militancy as a Com-
munist tactic (397-8), but follows this editorial up with a cautionary item 
about how a Nova Scotia company had tried unsuccessfully (because it had 
failed to follow proper channels) to use the Mounties against strikers 
(407-8). Just because the Communists tried to use labour for their ends did 
not make the Mounties indiscriminately anti-labour, as such. It is interest-
ing to note that when the Intelligence Branch reported formally to the 
Director of Criminal Investigations on an annual basis on the past year's 
activities, the largest amount of space was always devoted to an inventory 
of strikes and labour disturbances under the rubric of 'industrial unrest*. 
Yet specific reports on strikes most often concluded with an indication that 
the strikers had comported themselves in a peaceful and orderly fashion. 
Occasionally the activity of politically dangerous agitators was noted, but 
given the rigorous structure of wartime controls these usually concluded 
with indications of successful criminal action taken against the offending 
persons by local police or even by the RCMP itself. Although labour 
unions, or at least strikes, were a preoccupation of the InteUigence Branch, 
they were not an obsession. 
Occasionally, the preoccupation with the left was balanced with some 
equivalent concerns about fascism, especially if it was directly linked to 
the Nazi enemy. The Mounties kept a watchful eye on Otto Strasser, a 
former high Nazi official who was organizing an anti-Nazi 'Free German 
Passing secret information on Canadians to the Americans, either via State 
Department diplomats resident in Canada, or directly to the FBI in Washington was 
another matter. In the Cold War atmosphere of the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
occasional public notoriety was achieved when Canadians were barred from entry 
to the US based on information obviously passed by the RCMP to the US authorities. 
These internal reports, part of a process that eventually would result in a public 
Annual Report, have been obtained for the war yearsfrom CSIS under the Access 
to Information Act, with surprisingly few deletions, (CSIS, Access No. 117-91-11). 
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Movement' from a Canadian address. In May 1945, looking to Germany's 
imminent defeat, the Bulletin offers an interesting description of how SS 
personnel can be identified (278-80). After the war, the RCMP tended to 
take a hard line against the admission to Canada of former SS men, while 
Canadian bureaucrats and politicians and British and American intel-
Oft 
ligence agencies were busily circumventing their efforts. 
With regard to the 'enemy alien' populations in Canada itself, the 
registration of which had become an RCMP responsibility earlier in the 
war, their internal counsel tended to be rather low key. By early 1942, 
internments of Germans and Italians judged dangerous to the war effort had 
begun to subside and increasing numbers of these internees were being 
released. The West Coast was, however, another story. The RCMP had 
investigated the Japanese-Canadian communities of British Columbia and 
scooped up 57 individuals they believed potentially dangerous shortly after 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. A thoroughly war-spooked, not to 
say racist, population on the coast demanded the removal of the entire 
Japanese-Canadian community, which the federal government eventually 
effected. This massive operation, the forcible transfer of tens of thousands 
of persons to camps in the interior, and the disposal of their property, has 
of course become a cause célèbre in the history of civil liberties and race 
relations in Canada. More than four decades later, the government of 
Canada offered an official apology to Japanese-Canadians and compensa-
tion to the victims of this policy. The RCMP were inevitably involved in 
the evacuations and in the associated police work, as well as in interning 
those who actively resisted the policy. Yet it cannot be said that Mountie 
voices were added to the clamour of those demanding drastic action. On 
the contrary, the intelligence branch had been extremely cautious and 
moderate in its judgments about the potential threat of espionage and 
sabotage posed by the Japanese Canadians. This advice went unheeded by 
a government which rather lost its head, even though the prime minister 
later admitted that they never could attribute even a single concrete case of 
sabotage or espionage to Japanese-Canadians. From this episode, clearly 
the worst example of repression in the Canadian wartime record, the RCMP 
escapes with its reputation relatively unscathed. 
Reg Whitaker, Double Standard: the Secret History of Canadian Immigration 
(Toronto 1987), 102-47. On the circumvention of Canadian consols through 
foreign intervention there is an excellent but unpublished study for the (Deschênes) 
Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals: AIti Rodal, 'Nazi War Criminals in 
Canada: the Historical and Policy Setting from the 1940s to the Present' (September 
1986). A partial text has been released under the Access to Information Act. 
Recently the RCMP have been blamed for not being sufficiently alarmist, by four 
historians who have recently adopted a revisionist interpretation of the wartime 
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The Japanese were not an aberration: the Mounties showed no special 
hostility to any of the 'enemy alien' groups, as such. The Germans and 
Italians, as well as those who came from smaller central and eastern 
European nations allied to the Axis, were generally viewed by the Mounties 
as largely loyal and law abiding, despite the existence of some pro-Axis 
elements who could be fairly easily isolated and interned. The Mounties 
suspected — rightly as it turns out — that so long as the Axis powers 
seemed to be winning, disloyal sentiments might be harboured by some, 
but that once the tide of battle turned, the attraction of the enemy regimes 
in their homelands would wane. 
Readers of these Bulletins will note that much attention was paid by the 
Intelligence Branch to ethnic associations. The reporting on their activities 
is often quite detailed — reflecting the strength of their sources within these 
groups — and presents an argument for their republication, since much of 
the material found in these pages on Canadian ethnic associations has never 
seen the light of publication before. Worid War II was a period when the 
Canadian state attempted to mobilize immigrant groups for the war effort 
by strengthening the incorporation of 'ethnic* Canadians into fuller 
Canadian citizenship. In a very limited sense, the earliest origins of the 
later policy of multiculturalism can be traced to this experience. The 
attempt was largely abortive, due to the prevalence of the values of 
traditional Anglo-Saxon superiority, but also because 'security' considera-
tions won out among state officials over more imaginative and accom-
modative initiatives. The RCMP were charged with the task of maintaining 
detailed surveillance over political developments in the foreign-language 
encounter between the Canadian state and its Japanese citizens and residents: see 
Patricia Roy, J.L. Granatstein, Masako lino and Hiroko Takamura, Mutual 
Hostages: Canadians and Japanese During the Second World War (Toronto 1990), 
especially 47ff. 
That the Mounties lacked credible sources within the Japanese Canadian com-
munity was a fact, however, of which the Force itself was uncomfortably aware. In 
its internal annual report for 1941-2, the Intelligence Branch conceded that surveil-
lance of the community was 'maintained only with difficulty, as due to racial and 
physical dissimilarities, our sources of contact arc limited.' (Report dated 14 April 
1942 obtained under Access to information). 
*̂This comes out most clearly in the confidential annual reports of the Intelligence 
Branch. Sec n. 25, above. 
29 See Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds., On Guard For 
Thee: War. Ethnicity, and the Canadian State. J 939-1945 (Ottawa 1988). especial ly 
the articles by N.F. Dreisziger. 'The rise of a bureaucracy for multiculturalism: the 
origins of the Nationalities Branch. 1939-1941". 1-30 and Kordan and Luciuk, 'A 
prescription for nationbuilding: Ukrainian Canadians and the Canadian state, 
1939-1945-.85-100. 
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communities. In the case of the Japanese, RCMP intelligence reports were 
either (depending on one's point of view) insufficiently knowledgeable or 
insufficiently alarmist. Their reports on European groups, on the evidence 
of these pages, were relatively knowledgeable and anything but alarmist. 
Their report on the Mennonites [1 March 1943, 64-66] is extremely 
sympathetic, despite the fact that this group's pacifism, along with their 
non-capitalist concept of property, might have made them offensive to 
conservative police minds. 
A surprising degree of understanding toward European ethnic minorities 
was crosscut by intense ideological hostility toward pro-Conmiunist ethnic 
organizations. Although the Mountics have been characterized from time 
to time (mainly in Quebec) as an instrument of Anglo-Saxon hegemony, it 
is clear that anti-Communism was far more dominant a strain in the police 
mind than ethnic prejudice. Indeed, while evidence for the latter is thin, 
evidence of the former is manifest on almost every page of these Bulletins. 
While the Mounties could make allowances for, say, nationalist 
Ukrainians' flirtations from time to time with pro-Hitler sentiments, they 
would never budge an inch with regard to the pro-Communist Ukrainians, 
even when the latter became vociferous proponents of the anti-Nazi war 
effort. Their visceral distaste for the Left Ukrainians is reflected occasional-
ly in downright bizarre characterizations of their motivations. For instance, 
in the 1 March 1943 number, the complaint ofthe Ukrainian Labour Farmer 
Temple Association (banned under the Defence of Canada Regulations) 
that their property and halls had in some cases been sold by the Custodian 
of Alien Enemy Property to their 'bitter political enemies', the Ukrainian 
National Organization (a complaint echoed by a number of respectable civil 
libertarians in mainstream Canadian society) is dismissed in the following 
extraordinary fashion: 'The psychological effect upon the...membership 
through loss their halls to its [sic] opposition helps to keep alive the 
enthusiasm in their organization and produces a state of exuberance [!] so 
necessary to back their demands to the Government' (56). 
Ironically, even if the RCMP was not deeply concerned with the security 
risks posed by nationalist and conservative ethnic associations, the persist-
ent security risk they identified with left-wing pro-Conmiunist organiza-
tions may have queered the pitch for a more participative and 
accommodative role for all ethnic organizations in the war effort. To the 
Ottawa bureaucrats preoccupied with winning the war, any evidence of 
potential disloyalty or subversion was sufficient for general suspicion, 
especially where fine distinctions between obscure factions speaking 
foreign languages were called for. 
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It was explained in the introduction to the earlier volume covering the 
1939-1941 Bulletins that at the end of 1941, the government indicated to 
the Mounties that they no longer wished to receive the Bulletins for general 
circulation among cabinet ministers and their staff. How then were these 
Bulletins used? The May 1945 issue is headed by an editorial (269-70) that 
indicates precisely how the Intelligence Branch viewed these documents. 
They were essentially for the benefit of field officers, to keep them abreast 
of the wider national and international picture of intelligence and to 
counteract the tendency to become 'localized in viewpoint'. Readers, with 
historical hindsight of course, may form their own views of how broad a 
picture was actually being made available. But it is also evident from the 
complaining tone of the editorial that officers in the field may not always 
have taken the opportunity the Bulletins offered them. Six months later, 
another editorial advised Intelligence Branch consumers how to store the 
Bulletins in Accopress Binders thoughtfully provided for the purpose. An 
annual index would follow. 'The format is one lending itself to easy 
compilation as a ready and comprehensive reference fyle.' [1 November 
1945,411]. 
The war was over, but the Intelligence Branch was not winding down, 
but gearing up for a new era of more professional security and intelligence 
work. Although there had been no public notice of the fact yet, Igor 
Gouzenko had recently defected from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa with 
a sheaf of documents implicating the USSR in espionage. Within a few 
months —just after this collection of Bulletins halts — the Gouzenko affair 
would burst upon the world as one of the first incidents in the emergent 
Cold War with Soviet Communism. The security service could forget the 
uncomfortable situation of a wartime alliance with Stalin and get down 
unimpeded to the business that was to consume their attention for almost 
the next half century: anti-Communism. What we see in these wartime 
Intelligence Bulletins is the emergence of a surveillance state that would 
be continued into peacetime, directed against another official enemy. For 
the Mounties, however. Communism had always been the primary enemy 
even during a successful war against fascism in which Communism had 
been an ally, of sorts. 
•"•Kealey & Whitaker, RCMP Security Bulletins: the War Series, 1939-1941 (St. 
John's 1989), 17-18. 
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The preceeding volume in this series ended with the 24 December 1941 
Bulletin. This volume opens almost a year later with the 15 December 1942 
number. Access to Information requests to the Canadian Security Intel-
ligence Service to cover the period from the beginning of 1942 through to 
the end of 1945 were unsuccessful with regard to the January-December 
1942 period. While it is clear that Bulletins were produced during this 
period, CSIS has indicated that its Access section was unable to locate any 
copies of these missing documents. This appears to constitute an unfor-
tunate gap in the documentary record of security surveillance. No explana-
tion has been adduced for this hiatus. There are apparent gaps for January, 
April, June and July, 1943, but after this the record seems to be complete 
until the end of 1945. 
The liberal application of exemptions under the Access Act by CSIS to 
the Bulletins that were recovered is of course another matter. Complaints 
to the Information Commissioner regarding the extent of the exemptions 
on documents — that are, after all, nearly a half century old — were 
unsuccessful. Readers may appreciate the extent of these deletions by the 
indications we have provided. It is unfortunate, to say the least, that the 
magnitude of the censorship precludes confident judgments as to the 
quality of the material gathered by the security service. 
In the preparation of this volume, special thanks should go to Lois 
Harder of the doctoral program in Political Science at York University, who 
did a thorough and careful check of the transcription of the original 
documents into the form in which they are presented here. 
R.W. 
